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Current estimates of housing wealth effects vary widely.  We consider the role of omitted variables
suggested by economic theory that have been absent in a number of prior studies.  Our estimates take
into account age composition and wealth distribution (using poverty rates as a proxy), as well as wealth
shares (how much of total wealth is comprised of housing vs. stock wealth).  We exploit cross-state
variation in housing, stock wealth and other variables in a newly assembled panel data set and find
that the impact of housing on consumer spending depends crucially on age composition, poverty rates,
and the housing wealth share.  In particular, young people who are more likely to be credit-constrained,
and older homeowners, likely to be “trading down” on their housing stock, experience the largest housing
wealth effects, as suggested by theory.  Also, as suggested by theory, housing wealth effects are higher
in state-years with higher housing wealth shares, and in state-years with higher poverty rates (likely
reflecting the greater importance of credit constraints for those observations).  Taking these various
factors into account implies huge variation over time and across states in the size of housing wealth
effects.
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If the value of your house rose by $10,000 this year, by how much would your 
consumption this year rise?  It is a straightforward question, yet economists have failed to agree 
on an answer to it that is consistent with the theoretical modeling of consumption wealth effects, 
as evidenced by the (wide-ranging) empirical estimates of their magnitude.   
In theory, estimation of wealth effects should take into account variation related to age 
and the composition of wealth.  Consumers with different age and wealth characteristics should 
have different housing wealth effects.  Those that face binding constraints that limit their 
borrowing against future income or those that plan to downsize their housing consumption 
significantly should exhibit relatively large housing wealth effects, while those that neither face 
binding borrowing constraints nor are planning to downsize their housing consumption in the 
near term should exhibit smaller housing wealth effects.   
Empirical evidence on aggregate housing wealth effects has produced widely varying 
estimates.  A number of problems have made it difficult to interpret the sources of empirical 
disagreements across studies.  First is the challenge of finding reliable data on housing wealth, 
securities wealth, consumption and other variables of interest.  Although good measures of these 
variables exist for the U.S. as a whole, aggregation over regions with different economic cycles 
and limited degrees of freedom from time series aggregates make it difficult to obtain reliable 
estimates of consumers’ responses to variation in wealth and income.  In principle, the cross-
sectional variation in panel data for U.S. states would provide additional estimation power.  In 
practice, however, finding reliable state-level data is a challenge.  For example, state-level 
consumption is typically proxied using retail sales, while data on securities wealth is estimated 
by allocating aggregate figures across states using household surveys on mutual fund holdings.    2
This is particularly problematic because these surveys are only available for a handful of years, 
forcing researchers to interpolate across many intervening quarters.   
Second, wealth effect estimates are acutely prone to bias due to omitted variables.  For 
example, in a regression that omits unobservable permanent income, housing wealth changes 
(which likely are correlated with omitted expected future income) may proxy for the omitted 
variable; thus, observed housing wealth effects may overstate true wealth effects.  Calomiris, et 
al. (2009), following Campbell and Mankiw (1990), employ instrumental variables to address 
that problem, and find that taking account of this bias substantially reduces estimated housing 
wealth effects (see also Case, et al., 2011, who adopt that same approach). 
Third, the functional forms for estimating wealth effects in prior work generally are not 
consistent with some of the basic implications of the permanent-income/life-cycle model of 
consumption.  As Carroll and Zhou (2011) have noted, coefficient estimates from the standard 
empirical functional form that regresses the log of consumption (or its difference) on the logs of 
income, housing wealth, and securities wealth (or their differences) cannot be interpreted as 
measuring a standard wealth effect; instead they simply measure partial correlations between 
housing (or equities) and consumption.   
A particular problem with regressions using the standard functional form is that they 
posit a constant elasticity of consumption with respect to housing wealth.  The reasonableness of 
this assumption, however, depends on the constancy of the ratio of housing wealth to securities 
wealth.  If the housing wealth ratio is not constant, then assuming constant elasticities in 
estimation can result in severe bias.  To see why, consider two individuals, A and B, both of 
whom earn $50,000 per year and consume $55,000.  Individual A possesses $1,000 in securities 
wealth and $500,000 in housing wealth, while individual B possesses $500,000 in securities   3
wealth and $1,000 in housing wealth.  Suppose that actual individual behavior follows the 
following pattern: consumption equals 80% of current income plus 3% of total wealth, 
irrespective of whether wealth is in housing or securities.   
Suppose that one employs the standard functional form: ln            ln       ln   
   ln , where   is consumption,   is current income,   is housing wealth,   is stock wealth, and 
  ,   ,   , and    are parameters to be estimated.  Suppose that one runs this specification on a 
sample that pools together a population of many individuals, consisting of equal numbers of 
types A and B, and further suppose that the estimated elasticity of consumption with respect to 
housing wealth from that regression (parameter   ) is 0.015.  That estimate suggests that a 1 
percent increase in housing wealth should give rise to a 1.5 percent increase in consumption.  But 
that estimate is not close to accurate for either type of individual in the population.  For Type A 
individuals, when housing values rise by 1 percent, consumption rises by roughly 3 percent, 
since almost all of type A’s wealth is in housing.  For type B individuals, consumption is 
virtually unaffected when housing values rise by 1 percent, since housing wealth is a trivial 
fraction of total wealth.  One contribution of our paper is that we address this wealth-
heterogeneity problem by allowing the elasticity of consumption with respect to different types 
of wealth changes to vary with the ratios of each type of wealth to total wealth. 
Finally, as the theoretical insights of Buiter (2007) and Sinai and Souleles (2005) 
emphasize, the demographic characteristics of the population should matter for housing wealth 
effects.  If older people are more likely to downsize and younger people are more likely to face 
binding borrowing constraints against expected future income, then both young and old people 
should exhibit larger housing wealth effects relative to people who are neither young nor old.    4
Thus, in a panel analysis of U.S. states, heterogeneity across states or over time with respect to 
age distribution should have important implications for housing and securities wealth effects.   
Along a similar line of reasoning, we posit that the distribution of wealth should matter to 
the extent that borrowing constraints bind (which should raise estimated wealth effects of 
consumption).  Specifically, we allow wealth effects to depend on the extent of poverty in a 
state.  We expect that higher incidence of poverty (which, more broadly, reflects the share of the 
population with low levels of per capita wealth) will be associated with higher wealth effects 
because a greater proportion of low-wealth individuals (including homeowners) should be 
associated with more binding constraints on borrowing against permanent income.   
In this paper, we deal with all of these considerations when estimating consumption 
wealth effects for housing and securities.  First, we construct a new annual dataset for the U.S. 
states for the period 1981-2009.  By focusing on annual data, we are able to avoid excessive 
interpolation of missing values.  Second, we employ the same instrumental variables approach 
used in Calomiris, et al. (2009).  Unlike that study, we find housing wealth effects are positive 
and significant after instrumenting.  We attribute this change to improvement in the quality of the 
data employed in the present study. 
Third, as suggested by life-cycle consumption theory, we demonstrate that an empirical 
specification that takes into account the relative amount of housing and securities wealth in a 
given state-year improves the accuracy of the estimation.  This reflects the fact that there is 
substantial variation across states and over time in the composition of wealth.   
Fourth, taking account of demographic variation (differences in age and poverty rates) 
also proves to be important, both across states and over time.  As suggested by theory, housing 
wealth effects tend to be larger in state-years with high proportions of young and old people, and   5
those with higher poverty rates.  Given the substantial variation across states and over time in 
these population characteristics (reflecting, in part, the differential effects of the baby boom 
across states), it turns out to be important to take demographic differences into account when 
measuring wealth effects.   
Overall, we find that consumption responds positively to innovations in both housing 
wealth and securities wealth, but housing wealth effects are significantly larger than stock wealth 
effects.  On average, a one dollar increase in the value of housing wealth raises consumption by 
roughly five to eight cents.  In contrast, a one dollar increase in the value of securities wealth 
raises consumption by less than two cents on average.  Importantly, there is substantial variation 
across states and over time in both of these consumption responses to wealth changes, which are 
related to changes in the age, poverty and wealth characteristics of the population over time.  The 
responsiveness of consumption to changes in different types of wealth should therefore be 
understood within the historical context of the importance of housing wealth as a fraction of total 
wealth, and the demographic and wealth composition characteristics of the population. 
  Section II briefly reviews the literature on estimating the consumption elasticity of 
housing and stock wealth.  Section III describes our dataset.  Section IV presents our empirical 
findings, while Section V concludes. 
 
II. Previous Literature 
  Standard analysis of consumption decisions in a PIH framework indicates that an increase 
in the value of an agent’s assets should cause the agent to increase consumption.  Poterba (2000) 
summarizes the issues and findings relating to consumption effects of increases in stock values.    6
He points out that, even in the absence of credit constraints or other imperfections, agents that 
are rational, forward-looking optimizers should increase consumption in response to the higher 
wealth that stock price increases create.  It is therefore unsurprising that a number of papers 
(Ludvigson and Steindel, 1999, is one of many examples) find a significant, positive 
consumption wealth effect from increases in stock wealth.   
  Housing shares some similarity to equity in that it is an asset, and thus there may be a 
wealth effect on consumption from an increase in housing values.  However, housing is also a 
consumption good, and a wealth effect from higher home prices is not as theoretically obvious as 
in the case of stocks.  Buiter (2007) quotes Bank of England Governor Mervyn King, who stated 
that “housing wealth isn’t wealth.”  The value of a house is simply the present value of the 
housing services it delivers in the future.  Those who have more housing than they plan on 
consuming in the future (those who are net “long” housing) will be better off from an increase in 
house prices, and may as a result increase consumption; those owning less housing than they 
plan to consume in the future will be made worse off, and may decrease consumption as a result.  
On average, since most residents own the houses in which they live, there should be little net 
housing wealth effect.  Buiter thus presents a model in which the only way a net housing wealth 
effect is generated is through distributional considerations that result in small net wealth effects.   
Sinai and Souleles (2005) also develop a theoretical model in which aggregate housing 
wealth effects should be relatively small for aggregate non-housing consumption.  Their model, 
however, takes borrowing constraints into account, which makes it possible for housing wealth 
to exert a larger effect on consumption.  Because future income cannot be credibly pledged to 
lenders, the possession of housing wealth can increase current consumption for borrowers with 
high expected future income growth.  Indeed, housing wealth may be superior to stock wealth as   7
collateral, since maximum permissible loan-to-value ratios on mortgages are much higher than 
margin limits on stocks, and because mortgage interest is tax-deductible, while margin loan 
interest is not.  As in Buiter (2007), an increase in house prices causes higher housing asset 
values, but also an equivalent increase in housing liabilities (the cost of future housing 
consumption) ; any effect from increases in housing values on non-housing consumption, 
therefore, primarily reflects the impact of the relaxation of borrowing constraints on consumers 
(given housing’s special value as collateral for consumer borrowing).   
  Thus, theoretically it is not at all clear that a substantial housing wealth effect on 
aggregate non-housing consumption should be observed; the size of the effect depends on the 
proportion of the population subject to binding borrowing constraints, and the distribution of the 
wealth in the population that is either net long or net short housing.  The housing wealth effect 
may be greatest for younger homeowners who are most likely to suffer from credit constraints, or 
for older homeowners who are contemplating imminent downsizing.   
  Given the theoretical ambiguities of the housing wealth effect, a number of papers have 
attempted to empirically gauge the impact of rising home prices on consumption, and compare 
that housing wealth effect with the effect of stock wealth changes on consumption.  Carroll, et al. 
(2011) examine the housing wealth effect in the context of a habit formation model using 
aggregate time series data.  The authors find that consumption rises more in response to housing 
than to stock wealth.   
Carroll and Zhou (2011) use a panel data set of U.S. states to examine the housing wealth 
effect; the authors find a positive housing wealth effect, but no significant stock wealth effect.  
They construct new data on consumption and financial wealth at the state level semi-annually 
that is likely more accurate than the data used in some previous papers.  As in the present study,   8
the authors employ data based on the FHFA home price index.
1  A major limitation of their data, 
however, is that it only runs from 2001 through 2005.  This is a much shorter span than prior 
panel-based studies, which often have data covering three decades or more.  As a result, the 
Carroll and Zhou (2011) data set misses out on most of the more volatile and infamous national 
and local housing cycles over the past 30 years.   
Several studies employ micro data on households.  Mian and Sufi (2011) analyze data on 
75,000 existing homeowners over time and across Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and 
conclude that the recent housing boom boosted consumption in the United States.  Like us, Mian 
and Sufi analyze how age and financing constraints affect wealth effects, finding that younger 
homeowners and those with low credit scores and greater reliance on credit card borrowing 
(which may proxy for financing constraints) respond more to a rise in home values by borrowing 
against the value of their homes.  Bostic, et al. (2009) examine data from both the Survey of 
Consumer Finances and the Consumer Expenditure Survey, finding that housing wealth appears 
most highly associated with non-durable consumption, while financial wealth is most closely 
linked with expenditures on durables.   
  One of the most highly cited studies on housing wealth effects is Case, Quigley and 
Shiller (CQS, 2005).  This study uses a panel of quarterly data for US states running 1982-1999, 
as well as a panel of fourteen OECD countries using annual data over the same period.  The 
authors later updated this study (CQS, 2011); the new panel data set (for U.S. states only in this 
version) runs from 1978-2009.   
                                                 
1 FHFA (the Federal Housing Finance Agency) was formerly known as the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO).     9
CQS (2005, 2011) estimate the effects of wealth on consumption in a variety of ways.  
First, they model the level of consumption as a function of the level of income, and stock and 
housing wealth.  Next, they model the difference in consumption as a function of differences in 
housing, stock wealth and income.  CQS also estimate a version of an error correction model, in 
which the parameters of the cointegrating vector are imposed (income affects consumption one-
to-one).  In all of these specifications, housing wealth is found to have a positive and significant 
effect on consumption, and in nearly all cases, the housing wealth coefficient is larger than that 
of stock wealth.  While the 2005 study only covers the years 1982-1999 and misses the latest 
dramatic rise and fall in house prices, the more recent study has been updated with quarterly data 
spanning 1978-2009.   
In their 2005 paper, CQS regress the current change in consumption on the current 
change in income, housing and stock wealth (without instrumenting).  This causes a potentially 
severe endogeneity problem.  Aron and Muellbauer (2006) point out that studies of the housing 
wealth effect tend to be plagued by “poor controls for common drivers” of both housing wealth 
and consumption.  One key common driver is permanent income.  An increase in expected 
permanent income will increase both consumption and demand for homes, and therefore house 
prices.  Because CQS (2005) do not control for shocks related to permanent income, it is possible 
that their results are driven by correlations between permanent income shocks (which should be 
the dominant source of housing price changes across time and across states) and housing price 
changes.  In other words, in states where housing prices are rising, that rise reflects not just past 
income growth, but expectations of future income growth, which may produce improvements in 
many current market indicators, including rising home values.     10
In CQS (2011), the authors do include regressions that control for omitted 
variable/endogeneity bias by instrumenting wealth, following the methodology of Campbell and 
Mankiw (1990).  The results of the 2011 paper are qualitatively similar to the earlier paper – an 
increase in housing wealth is associated with a statistically significant increase in consumption, 
and this effect is larger than that of an increase in stock wealth – although the authors now report 
a wider range of parameter estimates.   
Using the CQS (2005) quarterly data but applying the Campbell and Mankiw (1990) 
instrumenting technique, Calomiris, et al. (2009) show that the CQS (2005) wealth effect 
estimates are substantially reduced.  Thus, the increased size and statistical significance of 
housing wealth effects reported in CQS (2011) – in contrast to Calomiris, et al. (2009) – seem to 
result from the addition of new data. 
  While the attempt to measure housing wealth at the state level is a major contribution of 
CQS (2005, 2011), the use of quarterly data to measure wealth effects may be problematic.  If 
consumption takes longer than one quarter to fully respond to a change in housing wealth then 
their estimates will be biased, since, in the CQS specification, consumption must respond to a 
change in home prices within the same quarter.  Even if the regressors were lagged (which they 
are not), it is unlikely that the full effect of housing wealth would exert itself upon consumption 
in just one quarter.   Indeed, Carroll, et al. (2011) estimate housing wealth effects within a habit 
formation framework and point out that it could take several years for a change in wealth to fully 
exert itself on consumption.  Along these lines, Carroll and Zhou (2011) allow for a two year 
window to capture the impact of wealth changes on consumer spending.  To address this issue, 
we employ annual data in our study.  Annual data also allow us to avoid excessive interpolation 
of stock wealth data (see the Data Appendix for a detailed discussion of this issue), and to   11
employ other data that are only available at annual frequency – i.e., demographic variables that 
are likely to matter for the size of housing wealth effects, as discussed above.
2   
Ours is not the first study to examine the demographic aspects of housing wealth effects.  
Campbell and Cocco (2007) employ micro data, and find that older homeowners (those over 
forty) exhibit greater wealth effects than those under forty.  This finding is consistent with older 
homeowners being net long housing due to anticipated downsizing; however, the authors only 
divide their age groups into “old” and “young”, making no allowance for middle age.  Attanasio, 
et al. (2009) divide age groups into three categories: young (under 35), middle-aged (35-60) and 
old (over 60).  They find that their estimated housing wealth effect is larger for the young than 
the old.  Since the young are not likely looking to trade down, and are more likely to include 
non-homeowners, the authors believe that the estimated wealth effect likely reflects omitted 
factors.  In particular, consistent with Sinai and Souleles (2005), we would note that young 
people are most likely to suffer from credit constraints, and thus the impact of house prices on 
the consumption of the young may well represent an effect of home values on consumer 
spending.   
The results of Campbell and Cocco (2007) and Attanasio, et al. (2009) are promising, and 
point to important potential demographic influences.  However, both restrict themselves to data 
for the United Kingdom.  Contreras and Nichols (2010) examine a micro panel data set for the 
United States, and include controls for demographics (they include the age of the household head 
and its square).  They also note that the effect of housing on consumption depends on housing’s 
                                                 
2 We recognize that our own annual contemporaneous modeling of the response of consumption to changes in 
income and wealth may not fully capture the long-run response of consumption to these changes.  Adding lagged 
consumption growth to our panel estimation in the presence of state fixed effects, however, would yield inconsistent 
estimates.  While there are techniques that yield consistent estimates for dynamic panels with fixed effects, they are 
unreliable in small samples like ours.  Given that we regard state fixed effects as warranted, we choose to model 
only contemporaneous annual responses.    12
proportion of total housing wealth.  Dividing the country into nine regions, they find that those 
areas with the most cyclical house price changes also typically display the highest housing 
wealth, and often exhibit a high estimated elasticity of consumption with respect to home values, 
as well as smaller ratios of consumption to housing wealth.   
The dependence of the wealth effect on the ratio of housing wealth to total wealth is an 
important insight.  As discussed in Section I, in a standard PIH model, the impact of housing on 
consumption should depend on the relative importance of housing wealth, and on the size of total 
wealth (relative to consumption).  One of the contributions of our study is the development of a 
model that explicitly allows housing and stock wealth effects to vary based on what fraction of 
total wealth they comprise.   
In summary, the existing literature on consumption responses to changes in housing and 
securities wealth has pointed in several promising directions, which we pursue below: (1) panel 
estimation of wealth effects (as in CQS) can add statistical power by taking advantage of 
variation across states and across time; (2) endogeneity/omitted variable bias is a concern that 
can be addressed by instrumenting wealth and income, as in Campbell and Mankiw (1990); (3) 
functional forms for estimating housing and securities wealth effects on consumption should take 
into account the basic logic of the PIH, which requires that elasticities be allowed to vary with 
differences in the relative proportions of housing and securities wealth; and (4) differences 
within populations in the proportions of different age groups, and in the distribution of wealth 
(the incidence of poverty), are likely to be important in influencing the magnitude of measured 
wealth effects.   13
III. Data 
  In what follows, we provide a brief description of the data used in our analysis; a more 
detailed description of our data sources is provided in the Data Appendix.  Following CQS 
(2005, 2011), we use retail sales as a proxy for consumption, using state-level estimates from 
1977Q1 through 2010Q1 provided by Moody’s Economy.com.  The underlying data for retail 
sales at the state level are nominal, seasonally-adjusted annual rates at a quarterly frequency; our 
annual figures are the average of the quarterly SAAR values within each year.   
  Housing wealth is measured as the average value of owner-occupied housing times the 
number of owner-occupants within each state.  The average value of owner-occupied housing 
each quarter is taken from the Land Prices by State Dataset developed by Davis and Heathcote 
(2007) and provided by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy; we use 4
th quarter figures as the 
value for the year.  The number of owner-occupied households in each state each year is derived 
from the Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement to the Current Population Survey 
(CPS).  A detailed description of how we calculated these estimates is provided in the Data 
Appendix.  Total nominal housing wealth in each state year is then calculated as the average 
value of owner-occupied housing times the number of owner households.   
  Total U.S. stock wealth is calculated as the sum of corporate equities, mutual fund shares 
and pension fund reserves for households and non-profit corporations from the Federal Reserve 
Z1 statistical release; we use year-end (4
th quarter) values.  We allocate that measure of 
aggregate annual U.S. stock wealth among states based on the estimated share of mutual fund 
holdings across states.  Mutual fund share estimates for each state are available only for 1986, 
1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 2000, 2008 and 2009.  For years prior to 1986, we used 1986   14
values; values for the remaining missing years of each state’s share in total mutual fund share 
percentages (1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996-1999, and 2001-2007) were interpolated linearly.  
Estimated nominal stock wealth in each state is then calculated as the aggregate U.S. stock 
wealth times each state’s share of aggregate mutual fund holdings.   
  Other variables used in the analysis include real per-capita personal income from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and annual population estimates by age group and poverty 
rates from the U.S. Census.  We transform our consumption, income and all three wealth 
variables (housing wealth, stock wealth, and total wealth) into real, per-capita values by dividing 
by population and deflating using the GDP implicit price deflator.  Unless otherwise stated 
below, all regressions below are run on log differences of these real, per-capita values.   
  Our measures of housing and stock wealth differ from those of CQS (2011) in several 
ways.
3  CQS measure housing wealth using the Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss indices to capture 
quarterly changes in house values at the state level.  Davis and Heathcote’s measure of housing 
wealth uses actual 1980, 1990, and 2000 census figures for the average value of owner-occupied 
homes in those years and, as discussed in the Data Appendix, only relies on the FHFA index to 
fill in intervening years.
 4  In contrast, CQS use only the 2000 census year to benchmark their 
housing value estimates.  With respect to stock wealth, CQS use a similar approach to ours, 
                                                 
3 In the discussion that follows, we mainly compare our data with CQS (2011).  Differences with Carroll and Zhou 
(2011) are more substantial and reflect the limited availability of state-level data on securities wealth and 
consumption. 
4 Both the FHFA and the Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss indices are based on comparisons over time of transactions 
involving the same house, in contrast to hedonic pricing models that attempt to control for house characteristics.                                     
These same-sales indexes, however, can suffer from selectivity bias relating to the timing of particular types of 
house sales.  For example, during the 2007-2009 period, housing sales include a large proportion of distressed home 
sales (foreclosures and the like), and observed values of the indexes may provide an exaggerated picture of housing 
price decline.  Indeed, Leventis (2009) provides evidence that this is the case. One could make a similar argument 
that during the subprime housing boom of 2004-2006, transactions gave an unrepresentative and exaggerated picture 
of housing price increases.    15
although they lack data for 1995 and 2000 on state-level mutual fund shares, which requires that 
they interpolate over the entire period from 1993 to 2008.   
Unlike CQS, we rely on annual rather than quarterly data.  The sample period is long 
enough for annual data to provide reasonably precise estimation of wealth effects, and we regard 
annual data as more reliable for several reasons.   
First, given the limited number of observations about equity holdings and the consequent 
need to interpolate states’ shares of mutual funds, we are less comfortable constructing estimated 
quarterly observations for stock wealth.  Quarterly interpolation is particularly problematic since 
the spotty data on mutual fund shares at the state level are not associated with a particular quarter 
within the year.  Furthermore, forcing stock holdings to change smoothly over time while 
allowing housing wealth to vary quarterly may exaggerate the relative size of housing wealth 
effects (especially if the two kinds of wealth are positively correlated).  While this problem 
remains with our annual data, it should be less pronounced than it is with quarterly interpolation. 
Second, the selectivity bias in measuring house prices resulting from using same house 
sales as a measure of underlying housing value will be more pronounced with higher-frequency 
quarterly data; temporal aggregation should reduce some of the cyclical bias related to the use of 
a same-sales housing price index.   
Third, the use of annual data avoids having to take a position about the appropriate means 
of adjusting for seasonality in personal income and house prices; adjusting for seasonality is 
especially challenging given the potential for differences in seasonal patterns across states with 
very different age structure and weather patterns.     16
Finally, our population, age composition and poverty estimates are only available at an 
annual frequency.   
  
IV. Empirical Analysis 
Variation across States and Over Time in Wealth and Population Composition 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the variables used in this study, pooling data across 
states and over time.  As discussed above, our study emphasizes how variation in age groups, 
poverty incidence, and the proportion of wealth in housing, can affect the estimation of 
consumption wealth effects for housing and stock.  Table 2 shows how our demographic 
variables vary across states.  The states with the smallest and largest average proportions of 
young adults are West Virginia (27.6 percent) and Utah (39.4 percent), respectively.  Alaska has 
the largest percentage of middle-aged (45.2 percent), while Florida has the lowest percentage 
(35.1 percent).  Alaska is home to the smallest proportion of old (18.7 percent), while the state 
with the highest proportion of old, Florida, had twice that proportion (37.3 percent).  Mississippi 
has the largest average poverty rate, at 21.2 percent, while New Hampshire’s poverty rate is the 
lowest (6.7 percent).   
  Figures 1A and 1B plot how the age distribution has changed over time for a sample of 
eleven states, and for the U.S. as a whole.  The percent of the adult population that is “young” 
(ages 20-34) is plotted on the x axis, while the percent of the adult population that is “old” (ages 
55+) is plotted on the y axis.  Clearly, despite the differences in average population composition 
across states, states followed a similar within-state pattern over time.  The proportion of young 
people declined steadily from 1985 to about 2000 while the proportion of old remained roughly   17
constant.  After 2000, the proportion of young people was roughly constant, while the proportion 
of old people rose steadily.  This pattern reflects the effects on population composition of the 
post-World War II “baby boom.” 
  Figure 2 shows the variation in the poverty rate over time for each state.  States are 
arrayed on the x axis, with each dot representing one year’s value for the poverty rate for that 
state.  From this figure it is clear that there is as much or more variation in the poverty rate over 
time within states as there is across states.   
Similarly, Figure 3 plots the ratio of housing wealth to total wealth for each state over 
time.  As with the poverty rate, this figure shows variation in the average ratio of housing wealth 
across states as well as over time within states.  For example, Nebraska displays a low average 
proportion of housing wealth and a relatively small amount of variation over time in the housing 
wealth ratio.  Hawaii displays a high average proportion of housing wealth and a relatively small 
amount of variation around that mean.  Other states – Louisiana, Mississippi, and West Virginia, 
for example – have average ratios closer to the national mean and show much greater variation 
over time in those ratios.   
Figure 4 shows that this variation over time in the proportion of housing wealth follows a 
similar pattern across the various states, although some states display more pronounced variation 
over time than others.  The housing wealth ratio declined from 1985 to 2000, then rose during 
the early 2000s, and fell again during the post-2006 subprime crisis. 
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Calculating Wealth Effects 
Our full regression model allows the estimated consumption elasticities of housing and 
stock wealth to vary as a function of the relative size of housing and stock wealth.  We do this by 
including the log difference of total wealth in the model.  As we show below, this specification 
allows the housing and stock wealth elasticities to vary based on their shares of total wealth.  In 
addition, our model includes interaction effects between the wealth variables and the 
demographic variables.  Our full regression specification can be written as: 
Δln              Δln         Δln         Δln         Δln                             
           Δl n                Δl n                Δl n               Δl n    
          Δl n               Δl n               Δl n               Δl n    
          Δl n           
Where     is real, per-capita consumption in state   at time  ,     is real, per-capita housing 
wealth in state   at time  ,     is real, per-capita stock wealth in state   at time  ,     is real, per 
capital total wealth in state   at time  ,     is real, per-capita personal income in state   at time  , 
     is the percent of the adult population aged 20-34 in state   at time  , and     is the percent of 
the adult population aged 55+ in state   at time  , and     is the poverty rate in state   at time  .   
Noting that                 and Δln       l n        l n            , the impact of a one 
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where bars denote sample mean values of the variable/ratio in question.  We will sometimes refer 
to  
  
    as the housing wealth effect (HWE), and to the analogous derivative of consumption with 
respect to stock wealth  
  
     as the stock wealth effect (SWE).  The consumption elasticity of 
housing wealth is therefore simply    
      
  /  
  /                                                                      
   
   
;  (2)
  
stock wealth effects and elasticities are calculated analogously.   
Notice that in this specification, the consumption elasticities of housing and stock wealth 
explicitly depend on the shares of total wealth.  To see this, consider a simplified version of the 
model that does not include demographic variables.  In this case, the consumption elasticity of 
housing wealth simplifies to             
    
   .  In other words, the consumption elasticity of 
housing wealth is not constant in this model, but rather depends directly on how large a fraction 
of total wealth housing wealth comprises.   
In addition to average (sample mean) housing wealth effects and elasticities, we can also 
calculate predicted values for each state-year observation:   
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Calculating predicted housing and stock wealth effects allows us to map how these effects have 
changed over time due to changes in demographics and wealth ratios.   
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We hypothesize that all three of these derivatives should be positive.  A higher proportion of 
young people or people with low wealth should be associated with more binding borrowing 
constraints, which should raise the wealth effect.  Similarly, a larger proportion of older people 
(for whom downsizing of housing consumption is more likely) should also produce a larger 
wealth effect.  Note that our model specification also implies that 
    
    
  is higher when housing 
wealth (   ) is lower, ceteris paribus (because     only appears in the denominator of expression 
(3) above).   
  For comparison purposes, we present four additional specifications that do not include all 
the effects modeled above.  All estimations are specified as log differences to satisfy stationarity 
requirements, and follow the Campbell and Mankiw (1990) instrumenting procedure, as in   21
Calomiris, et al. (2009).  In addition, all of our regressions control for state fixed effects.
5  
Presumably, these fixed effects capture average differences across states in expected future 
income growth, human capital, and other omitted factors that influence consumption growth 
rates.  We do not include time effects, since much of the annual variation in wealth (especially in 
stock wealth) reflects common factors that affect all the states (e.g., the stock market).  Standard 
errors are clustered by state.  Despite some minor differences, results are quite similar across all 
these specifications, as we discuss further below.   
In a supplemental appendix, we also report results from OLS log difference regressions, 
for comparison purposes.
6  We do not report error-correction model results, since the variables in 
our model do not appear to be cointegrated, as discussed in the following brief digression.   
 
Is an Error-Correction Model Warranted? 
  Some authors (e.g., CQS, 2005, 2011) estimate error-correction models of housing wealth 
effects.  This approach, however, has drawn criticism.  Carroll, et al. (2011) argue that changes 
in interest or growth rates should change the relationships among other variables (e.g., 
consumption, income and wealth), thus eliminating a stable cointegrating vector among those 
variables.  If the cointegrating vector is not stable, according to the well-known Granger 
representation theorem, an error correction model would not make sense.   
  We tested for the possibility of cointegration among all four variables in our system 
(consumption, income, housing wealth, and stock wealth) by utilizing the panel cointegration test 
of Westerlund (2007).  A traditional challenge in testing for cointegration is the lack of power in 
                                                 
5 The state fixed effects coefficients for our full specification (Model 5) are reported in Appendix Table A1. 
6 Supplemental appendices can be found at http://realestate.wichita.edu/draft/research/academic_research.asp.    22
traditional methods such as the Johansen-Juselius technique, which posits the null hypothesis as 
a lack of cointegration; a lack of power means that one will often conclude that the variables in 
question are not cointegrated, when in fact there could be a stationary long-run relationship 
among them.   
Fortunately, however, we are utilizing a panel dataset.  The larger panel dataset increases 
the power of the test, just as panel unit root tests increase the power of testing for nonstationarity 
in a single series.  Some early panel cointegration tests suffered from low power, which arose 
from imposing restrictions, such as requiring the long-run parameters to be equal to the short run 
responses in differences (see Westerlund 2007), or not allowing for cross-sectional dependence.  
Note that allowing for cross-sectional dependence is vital in our study, as there are clearly 
common shocks to income, stock and housing wealth across states.   
Westerlund (2007) has developed a test for panel cointegration which does not impose 
such restrictions and has been demonstrated in simulations to have greater power than existing 
panel cointegration tests.  By applying this test, we are choosing a technique with a high 
probability of finding a cointegrating relationship if one exists.   
  In particular, the Westerlund technique tests for the significance of the error-correction, 
or speed-of-adjustment term.  Consider a simple model, where   is a variable and   is a vector of 
variables: 
Δ           ,        
   ,          Δ  ,          Δ  ,           
Here     is the error correction term, and   ,        
   ,    is the cointegrating vector.  Again, by 
the Granger representation theorem, if the variables are cointegrated, the model has an error   23
correction representation as shown in the above expression.  The Westerlund technique thus tests 
for the significance of   ; if it is significant, then the variables are cointegrated.   
When allowing for a trend, cross-sectional dependence, and differing speed of adjustment 
coefficients across the four variables, we were unable to reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration.  Specifically, the Westerlund test statistic was -2.792, implying a p-value of 0.235.  
This suggests that it would not be appropriate to model wealth effects using an error-correction 
model.   
 
Estimation Results 
  Table 3 reports our regression results.  Model 1 is a traditional specification including 
only income, housing wealth and stock wealth.  Model 2 includes total wealth, allowing housing 
and stock wealth elasticities to vary based on their proportions of total wealth.  Model 3 adds age 
and poverty demographics to the model but does not allow elasticities to vary with wealth shares.  
Model 4 includes age demographics and wealth shares effects, while Model 5 is the full 
specification including age demographics, the poverty rate and wealth shares effects.   
  Based on the regression results reported in Table 3, Table 4 shows, for each of the five 
models, the implied average housing wealth effects (HWE), average stock wealth effects (SWE), 
average elasticities of consumption with respect to housing and stock wealth, and the derivatives 
of HWE and SWE with respect to age composition and poverty rates.  Recall that HWE and 
SWE measure the effects on consumption of a $1 increase in either housing wealth or stock 
wealth.  Using Model 5, a $1 increase in housing wealth raises contemporaneous consumption by 
roughly $0.08 on average.  In contrast, the effect of a $1 increase in stock wealth on consumption   24
is nil (although in the non-preferred specifications of Models 1-3, the average stock wealth effect 
is just less than $0.02).   
  As hypothesized above, in our preferred Model 5 the implied derivatives of HWE with 
respect to  ,   and   are all positive.  That is, higher proportions of young people and old 
people, and a higher poverty rate all act to raise the housing wealth effect for a state-year.  In 
contrast, the estimated derivatives of SWE with respect to   and   are negative.  It is worth 
noting, however, that the overall stock wealth effect is insignificantly different from zero, 
making the implied derivatives less relevant.  The insignificant estimated SWE reflects the 
offsetting influences of seven statistically significant coefficients from Model 5 in Table 3.  In 
other words, the net effect of combining several statistically significant influences is an overall 
stock wealth effect that is not measurably different from zero.   
  Figure 5 plots the pattern of average estimated wealth effects over time (averaging across 
states within each year) for our various specifications, with confidence intervals estimated under 
the restrictive assumption that within-year covariances of HWEs and SWEs across states are 
zero.
7  In Models 4 and 5, which include both age demographics and wealth ratios, stock wealth 
effects are relatively high during the stock market boom of the 1990s, when the proportion of 
stock wealth was relatively high; housing wealth effects fell sharply during this period.  Over 
time, however, average housing wealth effects have generally been declining.  The differences in 
the implied time variation of wealth effects for the different model specifications has interesting 
implications for understanding the factors that drive variation in housing and stock wealth effects 
                                                 
7 In principle, each of the state’s HWE and SWE observations in a given year has an error component, but this can 
only be calculated for a given assumption of the covariances among the states’ HWEs (or SWEs) within each year.  
By making a particular assumption – here, that covariance is zero – we are able to calculate the standard error in 
each year.  If one assumed positive covariances among states, confidence bands would widen accordingly. 
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across different time periods.  Models 2 and 3, which take into account only age variation or 
wealth composition (but not both simultaneously, as in Models 4 and 5), exhibit much smaller 
swings in wealth effects over time.  Demographic and wealth compositional effects, therefore, 
obviously are correlated, since Model 5’s time path is not a simple aggregation of the influences 
of Models 2 and 3 (wealth ratios and demographics).  In addition to plotting Figure 5 based on 
simple averages across states, we also examined alternative versions of Figure 5 (available in a 
supplemental appendix) which weigh states by consumption, total wealth, or population; all of 
these versions of Figure 5 appear virtually identical to the non-weighted version reported here. 
As hypothesized, poverty rate interactions are statistically significant and the derivative 
of the housing wealth effect with respect to poverty is positive (Table 4).  We interpret this as 
evidence that states with higher poverty also tend to experience more binding borrowing 
constraints on permanent income, which tends to strengthen the housing wealth effect.  Figure 5 
shows that the inclusion of poverty rates does not materially affect the patterns of time variation 
in the size of the two wealth effects once age effects are included, although it does increase the 
magnitude of the average estimated housing wealth effect.  In other words, the time patterns of 
the wealth effects are qualitatively similar across Model 4 (without poverty rates) and Model 5 
(with poverty rates).   
  Figure 6 is plotted under our full specification, and shows the extent of variation within 
each state over time in the implied housing and stock wealth effects.  Stock wealth effects vary 
less across states than do housing wealth effects. 
The inclusion of poverty rates affects the correlations between wealth effects and total 
wealth.  The top part of Figure 7 plots the relationship between total wealth and the housing and 
stock wealth effects under the Model 4 specification (which does not include poverty rates).  As   26
implied by our specifications, both of the estimated wealth effects decline as a function of 
wealth.  When poverty is included in the model, however, (as shown in the bottom half of Figure 
7) the association between estimated housing wealth elasticities and total wealth becomes more 
pronounced, while the association between estimated stock wealth elasticities and wealth 
becomes less pronounced.  This reflects the fact that the inclusion of poverty rates in the 
specification (which are strongly negatively correlated with real, per capita total wealth) 
increases the housing wealth effect for states with higher poverty rates.  Table 5 provides state-
level averages (sorted by the size of the housing wealth effect) of the housing wealth effect, the 
stock wealth effect, and the key variables that determine the size of these effects, as calculated in 
expression (1) above.   
In results not reported here, we explored whether the unemployment rate might serve as a 
better measure of wealth distribution than the poverty rate.  That is, we re-ran the specifications 
reported in Table 3 using unemployment instead of poverty for the regressions in columns (3) 
and (5).  Coefficients on unemployment interactions with wealth measures were less statistically 
significant.  The results for HWE and SWE reported in Table 4, as well as the wealth elasticities 
and wealth effect derivatives reported in Table 4, were quite similar.  Overall, we concluded 
from this analysis that unemployment is a somewhat noisier proxy than poverty rates for the 
distribution of wealth. 
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Why Are Stock Wealth Effects Relatively Small? 
  We consistently find that stock wealth effects, elasticities, and wealth effect derivatives 
are small relative to comparable effects relating to housing wealth.
8  This finding is puzzling, 
given that, in theory – as developed by Buiter (2007) and Sinai and Souleles (2005) – stock 
wealth effects should be larger than housing wealth effects.  We can think of two possible 
explanations for our findings: the relatively high volatility of stock wealth, and the relatively low 
proportion of the population that owns stock. 
  First, it may be that the higher volatility of stock wealth causes small short-run (one-year) 
responses of consumption to increases in stock wealth.  If consumption decisions are costly to 
reverse (e.g., if there are costs of liquidating consumer durables, “habit formation” effects, etc.) 
then consumers will respond less to volatile changes in wealth.  Indeed, several papers have 
found that consumers’ short-run responses to stock wealth are much lower than their long-run 
responses (see the discussion in Parker 2001).  
As shown in Table 6, on average, the coefficient of variation for housing wealth is 
generally lower than that of stock wealth.  Furthermore, for the vast majority of states, stock 
wealth is much more volatile than housing wealth.  There are eleven states for which the 
coefficient of variation is higher for housing wealth than for stock wealth, but in six of those 
eleven cases, the housing wealth coefficient of variation is no more than 11% higher than the 
stock wealth coefficient of variation.  Among the five cases where housing wealth is 
substantially more volatile than stock wealth (Delaware, New Jersey, District of Columbia, 
                                                 
8 Note that our finding of a larger wealth effect for housing compared to equities is consistent with previous studies 
for the U.S.  For instance, in nearly all specifications of CQS (2005), the housing wealth effect exceeds the stock 
wealth effect.  CQS (2011) update their study and similarly find small stock wealth effects compared to the imapct 
of housing wealth.  Carroll et al. (2011) find much larger housing than stock wealth effects, and Carroll and Zhou 
(2011) find a positive impact of housing wealth on consumption, but no significant impact of stocks.   28
Florida, and Oregon), two of those cases (DE and DC) exhibit housing volatility more than twice 
as high as stock wealth volatility.  In 40 of 51 cases, stock wealth is more volatile than housing 
wealth. In four of those 40 cases stock wealth volatility is no more than 11% higher, but in 36 of 
the 40 cases, it is substantially more volatile, and in 15 cases, stock wealth is more than twice as 
volatile as housing wealth.  In summary, in ten of 51 “states” (including DC), housing wealth 
and stock wealth are similarly volatile; in five states housing wealth is substantially more volatile 
than stock wealth; and in the remaining 36 states, stock wealth is substantially more volatile than 
housing wealth.  Furthermore, in only two states is housing wealth more than twice as volatile as 
stock wealth; but in 15 states stock wealth is more than twice as volatile as housing wealth. 
A second explanation for the low response of consumption to stock wealth could be 
aggregation bias.  If there are fixed costs to holding stocks (e.g., the cost of becoming familiar 
with stock market investments and the process of establishing brokerage accounts), then many 
people may simply not participate at all in the stock market.  In that case, the estimated stock 
wealth response for a state-year observation will be substantially downward biased, since the 
aggregate response reflects the behavior of only a portion of the population.  
While virtually everyone lives in a home, and roughly two-thirds of Americans owned 
their primary residence during our sample period, as shown in Table 7, only 15-21 percent of 
Americans (depending on the year) owned stocks, and only 10-18 percent owned pooled 
investment funds.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, future empirical work using household-
level data could distinguish between these two competing hypotheses – volatility differences of 
wealth and aggregation bias – to estimate their relative importance in explaining the relatively 
low marginal propensity to consume from stock wealth.  Nevertheless, for the purposes of our   29
study, it is relevant to note that both views are plausible, given the much greater volatility of 
stock wealth for most states and the much lower household participation rate in the stock market. 
 
V. Conclusion 
  Economic theory has several important implications for the empirical modeling of 
consumption wealth effects:  (1) The composition of wealth (the relative proportions of housing 
and stock wealth) should matter for the estimation of wealth effects on consumption associated 
with changes in either type of wealth; (2) age characteristics of the population should matter for 
estimation of housing wealth effects, either because of anticipated downsizing of housing by 
older residents, or because younger residents tend to face more binding constraints on borrowing 
against permanent income; (3) the proportion of low-wealth individuals may matter for wealth 
effects through its effect on the extent to which residents are likely to face binding borrowing 
constraints against permanent income; and (4) permanent income and wealth variation are likely 
correlated, which means that estimates of wealth effects may suffer from endogeneity/omitted 
variable bias. 
  This paper assembles new annual data on state-level housing wealth, stock wealth, and 
other variables for the period 1981 to 2009 in order to address each of these theoretical ideas.  In 
contrast to Calomiris, et al. (2009) – which was based on less-reliable data – we find evidence of 
a large average housing wealth effect during our sample period.  Consistent with theory, housing 
wealth effects vary dramatically over time and across states, reflecting variation in the proportion 
of housing wealth, variation in age composition associated with varying state-level experiences 
during the baby boom, and variation in the incidence of poverty.  Stock wealth effects, on   30
average, are much smaller than housing wealth effects, and they also vary over time and across 
states.  These estimates show the importance of taking account of wealth composition, age 
composition, and wealth distribution when estimating housing and stock wealth effects.  Wealth 
effects going forward, therefore, are likely to be very different from those of the past, as they will 
be contingent on a variety of demographic and economic characteristics that will change over 
time. 
  One advantage of our state-level aggregate analysis is that our specification may be 
useful to macroeconomic forecasters to gauge the time variation in wealth effects. The most 
important inputs on which we rely for our estimation – annual state-level data on the age of the 
population, the poverty rate, and the amount of housing wealth – are generally available with 
short lags, and therefore, could be used to update housing wealth effect forecasts annually. Given 
the amount of variation over time in wealth effects, this could be a useful forecasting tool.    
  Our finding that stock wealth effects are small and not highly statistically significant is at 
odds with some theoretical models. In the models developed by Buiter (2007) and Sinai and 
Souleles (2005), stock wealth effects, in general, should be larger than housing wealth effects, 
notwithstanding the greater usefulness of housing wealth as collateral for borrowing against 
permanent income.  It is worth noting that Carroll and Zhou (2011) – who employ better quality 
data on stock wealth for a shorter time period – also find a negligible stock wealth effect as did 
Carroll, et al. (2011), and Case, et al. (2005, 2011). We conjecture that the greater volatility of 
stock wealth and the lower rate of participation by households in the stock market can explain 
the relatively muted response of consumption to changes in stock market wealth.  
    31
References 
Aizcorbe, A,.A. Kennickell, and K. Moore (2003).  “Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: 
Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.”  Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
January.   
Aron, J. and J. Muellbauer (2006).  “Housing Wealth, Credit Conditions and Consumption.”  
MPRA Working Paper 24485. 
Attanasio, O., L. Blow, R. Hamilton and A. Leicester (2009).  “Booms and Busts: Consumption, 
House Prices and Expectations.”  Economica, 76, 20-50. 
Bostic, R., S. Gabriel and G. Painter (2009).  “Housing Wealth, Financial Wealth, and 
Consumption: New Evidence from Micro Data.”  Regional Science and Urban Economics, 39, 
79-89.   
Bucks, B.,, A. Kennickell, T. Mach, and K. Moore (2009).  “Changes in U.S. Family Finances 
from 2004 to 2007: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances.”  Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, Feb. 12.   
Bucks, B., A. Kennickell, and K. Moore (2006).  “Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: 
Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances.”  Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
March 22..   
Buiter, W. (2007).  “Lessons from the North Atlantic Financial Crisis.”  Center for Economic 
Policy Research No. 18.  
Calomiris, C., S. Longhofer and W. Miles (2009).  “The (Mythical?) Housing Wealth Effect?”  
NBER Working Paper 1575. 
Campbell and Cocco (2007).  “How do House Prices Affect Consumption?”  Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 54, 591-621.   
Campbell, J. and G. Mankiw (1990).  “Permanent Income, Current Income, and Consumption.”  
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 8, 265-279. 
Carroll, J., M. Otsuka and J. Slacalek (2011).  “How Large is the Housing Wealth Effect?  A 
New Approach.”  Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 43, 55-79.   
Carroll, J. and X. Zhou (2011).  “Measuring Housing Wealth Effects Using U.S. State Data.”  
Working Paper, John Hopkins University. 
Case, K., J. Quigley and R. Shiller (2005).  “Comparing Wealth Effects: The Stock Market 
versus the Housing Market.”  Advances in Macroeconomics, 5, pp. 1-34.   32
Case, K., J. Quigley and R. Shiller (2011).  “Wealth Effects Revisited 1978-2009.”  Cowles 
Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1784. 
Contreras, J. and J. Nichols (2010).  “Consumption Responses to Permanent and Transitory 
Shocks to House Appreciation.”  FEDS Working Paper 2010-32.  
Davis, M. and J. Heathecote (2007).  “The Price and Quantity of Residential Land in the United 
States.”  Journal of Monetary Economics, 54, 2595-2620. 
Kennickell A., M. Starr-McCluer, and A. Sunden (1997).  “Family Finances in the U.S.: Recent 
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances.”  Federal Reserve Bulletin, January.   
Kennickell A., M. Starr-McCluer, and B. Surette (2000).  “Recent Changes in U.S. Family 
Finances: Results from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances.”  Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
January.   
Leventis, A. (2009).  “The Impact of Distressed Sales on Repeat-Transactions House Price 
Indices.”  Working Paper, Federal Housing Finance Agency. 
Ludvigson, S. and C. Steindel (1999).  “How Important is the Stock Market Effect on 
Consumption?”  Research Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 29-51.  
Mian, A. and A. Sufi (2011).  “House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and the U.S. 
Household Leverage Crisis.”  American Economic Review, 101, 2132-56. 
Parker, Jonathan A. (2001).  “The Consumption Risk of the Stock Market.”  Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity 2, 279-348. 
Poterba, J. (2000).  “Stock Market Wealth and Consumption.”  Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 14, 99-118. 
Sinai, T. and N. Souleles (2005).  “Owner-Occupied Housing as a Hedge against Risk.”  
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 763-789. 
Westerlund, J. (2007).  “Testing for Error Correction in Panel Data.”  Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 69, 709-748. 
    33
 
 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs.    Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Consumption  1,275 11,997 2,186  6,887 20,973 
Income  1,275 29,550 6,544 15,877  63,053 
Housing  Wealth  1,275  45,348 21,778 17,173  170,507 
Stock  Wealth  1,275 56,169  24,989 7,496  120,102 
Total  Wealth  1,275 101,517  41,570 28,317  260,588 
Housing  Wealth  Percent  1,275 0.457 0.103 0.242 0.735 
Stock  Wealth  Percent  1,275 0.543 0.103 0.265 0.758 
Percent Young (Ages 20-34)   1,275  0.312  0.041  0.229  0.478 
Percent Middle Age (Ages 35-54)   1,275  0.384  0.034  0.292  0.499 
Percent Old (Ages 55+)   1,275  0.304  0.033  0.135  0.386 
Poverty  Rate  1,275 0.127 0.038 0.029 0.272 
Log Difference of  
  Consumption  1,275  0.012  0.033  -0.122  0.156 
  Income  1,275  0.019  0.022  -0.108  0.096 
  Housing Wealth  1,275  0.029  0.061  -0.372  0.259 
  Stock Wealth  1,275  0.056  0.152  -0.423  0.429 
  Total Wealth  1,275  0.041  0.094  -0.364  0.265 
Notes:    Consumption, income and wealth variables are expressed in real, per-capita terms.  Data are 
presented for the years 1985-2009 for all U.S. states and the District of Columbia; the years 1981-
1984 are excluded from the analysis because of lags used for instrumenting.    
 







































AK 36.1 45.2 18.7  9.5  KY 31.0 38.2 30.8 16.4  NY 30.8 38.2 31.0 14.9 
AL 30.8 37.5 31.7 17.0  LA 32.6 38.0 29.3 19.8  OH 30.1 38.3 31.6 12.0 
AR 29.6 36.5 33.9 17.7  MA  31.3 37.9 30.8 10.2  OK 30.7 37.1 32.2 15.2 
AZ 32.4 36.6 31.0 15.0  MD  31.4 40.5 28.1  9.0  OR 29.4 39.2 31.4 11.9 
CA 34.7 38.6 26.7 14.4  ME  28.0 39.4 32.6 11.6  PA 28.2 37.3 34.5 10.9 
CO 32.8 41.2 26.0 10.5  MI 30.8 39.0 30.2 12.4  RI 30.5 36.9 32.5 10.5 
CT 29.0 39.3 31.7  8.1  MN  31.3 39.1 29.6  9.9  SC 32.0 38.1 30.0 14.9 
DC 36.2 35.5 28.3 18.8  MO  30.1 37.6 32.3 12.5  SD 30.0 36.4 33.6 13.0 
DE 31.5 37.9 30.6  9.2  MS 32.2 36.9 30.9 21.2  TN 30.8 38.4 30.7 15.7 
FL 27.6 35.1 37.3 13.4  MT  28.0 39.4 32.7 14.8  TX 34.7 38.8 26.5 16.7 
GA 34.1 39.9 26.0 14.3  NC 32.0 38.1 29.9 13.8  UT 39.4 35.9 24.6  9.3 
HI 32.0 38.0 30.0 10.2  ND 31.3 35.9 32.8 12.0  VA 32.7 39.5 27.7  9.9 
IA 29.1 36.8 34.1 10.4  NE 30.5 37.3 32.2 10.6  VT 29.5 40.3 30.2  9.5 
ID 31.4 38.6 30.0 12.9  NH 30.1 41.0 28.9  6.7  WA  31.5 40.0 28.5 10.6 
IL 31.9 38.3 29.8 12.4  NJ 29.3 39.4 31.3  8.6  WI 30.4 38.4 31.2  9.7 
IN 31.2 38.3 30.5 11.2  NM  31.7 38.8 29.6 19.8  WV  27.6 37.4 35.0 17.6 
KS 31.0 37.5 31.5 11.3  NV 32.2 39.1 28.6 10.5  WY  30.3 40.3 29.4 10.8 
Notes:  Data are averaged over the years 1985-2009 for all U.S. states and the District of Columbia; the years 1981-1984 are excluded from the analysis 
because of lags used for instrumenting.   




Table 3 – 2SLS Panel Data Wealth Effect Regressions 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Income 0.878 ***  0.954 ***  0.636 ***  0.548  ***  0.562 *** 
(0.077)   (0.074)   (0.080)   (0.068)   (0.070)         
Housing Wealth  0.183 ***  -0.019 -0.345 -6.456 ***  -8.194 *** 
(0.026)   (0.087)   (0.495)   (1.635)   (2.157)         
Stock Wealth  0.058 ***  -0.150 0.949 ***  -7.381 ***  -8.556 *** 
(0.017)   (0.095)   (0.276)   (1.513)   (2.110)         
Total Wealth  0.398 **  13.872 ***  16.501 *** 
  (0.175)     (3.001)   (4.007)         
Young Percent   0.017 -0.016   0.016         
    (0.078)   (0.073)   (0.080)         
Old Percent  -0.271 ***  -0.516 ***  -0.454 *** 
    (0.084)   (0.073)   (0.092)         
Poverty Rate  0.001    0.001 *   
    (0.001)      (0.001)         
Young × Housing Wealth  0.634 8.457 ***  12.820 *** 
    (0.766)   (2.984)   (3.961)         
Old × Housing Wealth  1.044 11.962 ***  15.260 *** 
    (1.050)   (2.653)   (3.660)         
Poverty × Housing Wealth  0.006    -0.040         
    (0.011)      (0.027)         
Young × Stock Wealth  -1.039 *  10.217 ***  13.511 *** 
    (0.607)   (2.512)   (3.606)         
Old × Stock Wealth  -2.279 ***  12.224 ***  15.215 *** 
    (0.632)   (2.559)   (3.743)         
Poverty × Stock Wealth  0.008    -0.055 **  
    (0.009)      (0.026)         
Young × Total Wealth  -18.790 ***  -26.431 *** 
      (5.489)   (7.432)         
Old × Total Wealth   -23.442 ***  -29.430 *** 
      (4.800)   (6.682)         
Poverty × Total Wealth     0.112 **  
         (0.056)         
Constant  -0.011 ***  -0.010 ***  0.015 0.102 ***  0.069         
(0.001) (0.001) (0.044) (0.038)   (0.044)
Observations  1,275 1,275 1,275 1,275   1,275         
Wald Chi-square  388.74 ***  345.77 ***  808.97 ***  808.27 *** 1,089.48 *** 
  Degrees of freedom  53 54 62 62    66
Notes:  Standard errors (clustered by state) are shown in parentheses below the estimates.  The Wald Chi-square 
statistic tests for the joint significance of all of the coefficients except the constant term.    
*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level. 
** Coefficient significant at the 5% level. 
* Coefficient significant at the 10% level.   
  The dependent variable is log difference of real, per capita consumption (where consumption is proxied by 
state-level retail sales).  Wealth variables are expressed in log differences of real, per capita values.  Young 
Percent is the percent of the adult population ages 20-34; Old Percent is the percentage of the adult population 
ages 55 and up; Poverty is the poverty rate.   
  All wealth and interaction variables are instrumented using the 2
nd-4
th lags of these variables.   





Table 4 – Estimated Wealth Effects, Elasticities and Derivatives 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Housing Wealth Effect (HWE)  0.055 ***  0.049 ***  0.075 ***  0.067 ***  0.081 *** 
Stock Wealth Effect (SWE)  0.016 ***  0.018 ***  0.008 *  0.000   -0.005
  Difference  0.039 ***  0.031 ***  0.067 ***  0.066 ***  0.086 *** 
Housing Wealth Elasticity  0.183 ***  0.163 ***  0.250 ***  0.222 ***  0.270 *** 
Stock Wealth Elasticity  0.058 ***  0.066 ***  0.030 *  0.002   -0.019
  Difference  0.124 ***  0.097 ***  0.221 ***  0.220 ***  0.288 *** 
Wealth Effect Derivatives    
  d HWE / d Young Percent  0.191 -0.039    0.223
  d HWE / d Old Percent  0.314 0.376    0.545
  d HWE / d Poverty Rate  0.002     0.003
  d SWE / d Young Percent  -0.277 0.003    -0.224
  d SWE / d Old Percent  -0.607 -0.135    -0.204
  d SWE / d Poverty Rate  0.002     0.002
Notes:  Standard errors (clustered by state) are shown in parentheses below the estimates.   
*** Estimated value significant at the 1% level. 
** Estimated value significant at the 5% level. 
* Estimated value significant at the 10% level.   
  Housing and stock wealth effects are expressed in dollar terms and calculated at the sample mean values for all 
variables.  Housing and stock wealth elasticities and wealth effect derivatives are calculated at sample means 
for all variables as well. 
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Table 5 – Factors Affecting Estimated Housing and Stock Wealth Effects 

















SD 0.157 -0.002 0.548 0.288 0.300 0.336  13.008  0.347 0.653  82,818 
ND 0.138 -0.008 0.505 0.266 0.313 0.328  12.044  0.339 0.661  81,647 
MS 0.135 -0.027 0.340 0.404 0.322 0.309  21.236  0.495 0.505  64,275 
AR 0.129 0.001 0.371 0.368 0.296 0.339  17.732  0.466 0.534  66,822 
WV 0.126 -0.012 0.337 0.360 0.276 0.350  17.576  0.479 0.521  70,626 
IA  0.118 -0.010 0.405 0.215 0.291 0.341  10.432  0.340 0.660  90,098 
AL 0.112 -0.020 0.322 0.383 0.308 0.317  16.980  0.499 0.501  76,693 
LA 0.108 -0.008 0.346 0.362 0.326 0.293  19.756  0.474 0.526  70,930 
KY 0.105 -0.008 0.350 0.351 0.310 0.308  16.352  0.470 0.530  73,702 
NM 0.105 -0.015 0.278 0.302 0.317 0.296  19.752  0.501 0.499  85,708 
NE 0.104 -0.004 0.432 0.222 0.305 0.322  10.552  0.337 0.663  87,016 
TN 0.100 -0.013 0.327 0.365 0.308 0.307  15.708  0.494 0.506  80,978 
OK 0.098 0.010 0.375 0.310 0.307 0.322  15.208  0.426 0.574  70,442 
SC 0.096 -0.031 0.292 0.402 0.320 0.300  14.888  0.532 0.468  83,130 
FL 0.094 0.002 0.279 0.253 0.276 0.373  13.400  0.473 0.527  109,229 
MO 0.084 0.003 0.348 0.196 0.301 0.323  12.460  0.358 0.642  100,264 
KS 0.082 0.000 0.372 0.188 0.310 0.315  11.284  0.333 0.667  91,326 
ID  0.079 -0.006 0.299 0.277 0.314 0.300  12.896  0.474 0.526  88,820 
AZ 0.078 0.000 0.269 0.272 0.324 0.310  15.000  0.499 0.501  96,209 
MT 0.076 0.011 0.308 0.237 0.280 0.327  14.792  0.433 0.567  96,315 
IN  0.075 0.001 0.364 0.307 0.312 0.305  11.240  0.436 0.564  83,972 
NC 0.074 -0.001 0.296 0.325 0.320 0.299  13.832  0.496 0.504  87,872 
ME 0.073 -0.001 0.295 0.308 0.280 0.326  11.620  0.496 0.504  99,727 
PA 0.073 -0.002 0.276 0.209 0.282 0.345  10.868  0.428 0.572  102,995 
OR 0.072 -0.006 0.275 0.246 0.294 0.314  11.936  0.474 0.526  110,717 
GA 0.071 -0.017 0.311 0.346 0.341 0.260  14.296  0.490 0.510  86,760 
OH 0.069 0.005 0.320 0.238 0.301 0.316  12.048  0.415 0.585  92,230 
DE 0.066 -0.011 0.290 0.221 0.315 0.306 9.164 0.441 0.559  124,287 
MI 0.066 0.006 0.320 0.226 0.308 0.302  12.420  0.407 0.593  97,727 
NV 0.064 -0.013 0.288 0.349 0.322 0.286  10.456  0.526 0.474  101,637 
TX 0.061 0.021 0.421 0.336 0.347 0.265  16.676  0.420 0.580  73,066 
WI 0.060 0.002 0.328 0.221 0.304 0.312 9.680 0.393 0.607  101,515 
IL  0.059 0.000 0.257 0.214 0.319 0.298  12.372  0.445 0.555  108,790 
WA 0.053 -0.013 0.220 0.236 0.315 0.285  10.628  0.509 0.491  121,400 
CA 0.052 -0.022 0.161 0.240 0.347 0.267  14.364  0.589 0.411  132,668 
NY 0.052 0.004 0.216 0.172 0.308 0.310  14.920  0.439 0.561  114,358 
DC 0.048 0.000 0.153 0.105 0.362 0.283  18.808  0.425 0.575  150,173 
WY 0.048 0.007 0.306 0.233 0.303 0.294  10.824  0.428 0.572  102,442 
VA 0.046 -0.010 0.232 0.258 0.327 0.277 9.884 0.508 0.492  112,649   38
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VT 0.046 0.001 0.268 0.238 0.295 0.302 9.540 0.464 0.536  114,618 
MN 0.045 0.004 0.307 0.169 0.313 0.296 9.888 0.355 0.645  124,178 
MD 0.043 -0.013 0.207 0.215 0.314 0.281 9.044 0.506 0.494  129,027 
NJ  0.042 -0.007 0.193 0.173 0.293 0.313 8.584 0.472 0.528  148,834 
RI  0.042 0.014 0.216 0.225 0.305 0.325  10.480  0.498 0.502  109,141 
UT 0.042 -0.004 0.275 0.303 0.394 0.246 9.328 0.505 0.495  88,639 
MA 0.040 -0.001 0.197 0.180 0.313 0.308  10.152  0.469 0.531  146,918 
HI  0.039 -0.009 0.165 0.278 0.320 0.300  10.176  0.620 0.380  149,082 
CT 0.033 0.002 0.171 0.197 0.290 0.317 8.068 0.528 0.472  156,059 
CO 0.029 0.005 0.253 0.198 0.328 0.260  10.484  0.435 0.565  125,780 
NH 0.028 0.011 0.338 0.311 0.301 0.289 6.668 0.471 0.529  115,250 
AK -0.001  -0.004 0.329 0.288 0.361 0.187 9.496 0.448 0.552  97,818 
Total  0.073 -0.004 0.301 0.266 0.312 0.304  12.725  0.457 0.543  101,517 
Notes:    Cell entries are averages of the variable over the years 1985-2009; the years 1981-1984 are excluded from the analysis 
because of lags used for instrumenting. Note that the average housing and stock wealth effects over the entire sample are 
not the same as the housing and stock wealth effects calculated at the sample means of the variables, and thus the totals 
presented in this table correctly differ from the values shown in Table 4.   
  Variables are defined as follows:  
      HWE = Average housing wealth effect 
  SWE = Average stock wealth effect 
  Cons. / HW = Average consumption-to-housing wealth ratio 
  Cons. / SW = Average consumption-to-stock wealth ratio  
  Young Percent = Average percent of the adult population ages 20-34 
  Old Percent = Average percent of the adult population ages 55 and up 
  Poverty Rate = Average poverty rate 
  HW / TW = Average housing wealth-to-total wealth ratio 
  SW / TW = Average stock wealth-to-total wealth ratio 
  Total Wealth = Average real, per capita total wealth 
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Table 6 – Wealth Variability over Time by State 
Housing Wealth Effect  Stock Wealth Effect 









AK     41,295         8,768  0.21     57,802      27,055   0.47 
AL     34,109         9,055  0.27     43,743      27,256   0.62 
AR     28,541         7,174  0.25     38,998      20,480   0.53 
AZ     47,693       17,363  0.36     49,355      17,412   0.35 
CA     78,003       32,092  0.41     55,395      20,867   0.38 
CO     54,135       17,228  0.32     72,435      22,571   0.31 
CT     81,524       18,319  0.22     75,325      22,580   0.30 
DC     67,885       39,643  0.58     83,348      20,341   0.24 
DE     56,321       23,865  0.42     68,283      15,104   0.22 
FL     51,554       20,584  0.40     58,066      18,230   0.31 
GA     39,086         8,885  0.23     48,587      26,109   0.54 
HI     92,622       39,362  0.42     57,310      21,994   0.38 
IA     29,462         7,961  0.27     61,677      24,487   0.40 
ID     41,098       15,785  0.38     48,624      21,496   0.44 
IL     47,111       13,045  0.28     62,439      23,564   0.38 
IN     33,855         8,886  0.26     51,010      26,480   0.52 
KS     29,809         6,617  0.22     62,152      19,061   0.31 
KY     31,486         8,143  0.26     43,044      24,383   0.57 
LA     30,545         7,007  0.23     41,101      22,351   0.54 
MA     67,688       16,885  0.25     79,744      24,474   0.31 
MD     64,649       24,275  0.38     65,346      25,679   0.39 
ME     47,254       12,687  0.27     53,610      25,019   0.47 
MI     38,870       11,434  0.29     59,656      22,247   0.37 
MN     43,849       13,310  0.30     80,936      21,859   0.27 
MO     35,325         9,310  0.26     65,389      20,434   0.31 
MS     28,154         6,991  0.25     37,059      23,007   0.62 
MT     41,731       16,148  0.39     55,510      19,166   0.35 
NC     40,933       10,682  0.26     47,779      23,246   0.49 
ND     26,545         8,150  0.31     56,133      22,544   0.40 
NE     28,678         6,752  0.24     59,200      18,955   0.32 
NH     52,028       11,409  0.22     64,550      27,369   0.42 
NJ     70,637       20,246  0.29     78,525      16,485   0.21 
NM     40,918       11,123  0.27     45,414      21,210   0.47 
NV     51,698       20,089  0.39     50,756      23,337   0.46 
NY     49,607       12,348  0.25     65,296      17,931   0.27 
OH     36,375         7,628  0.21     56,758      23,858   0.42 
OK     27,199         4,527  0.17     44,370      22,918   0.52 
OR     52,857       23,719  0.45     58,849      23,191   0.39   40
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PA     43,278       11,641  0.27     60,388      20,190   0.33 
RI     52,738       15,420  0.29     57,505      23,592   0.41 
SC     39,898       12,161  0.30     44,109      27,964   0.63 
SD     28,467         9,972  0.35     55,394      19,743   0.36 
TN     36,731         8,904  0.24     44,895      24,705   0.55 
TX     28,223         5,018  0.18     45,571      21,832   0.48 
UT     42,550       14,740  0.35     47,040      23,752   0.50 
VA     54,753       15,840  0.29     59,035      28,125   0.48 
VT     52,165       13,640  0.26     63,436      21,284   0.34 
WA     60,788       21,816  0.36     61,798      25,995   0.42 
WI     38,421       11,554  0.30     63,882      25,674   0.40 
WV     30,221         7,442  0.25     41,342      24,449   0.59 
WY     43,413       15,681  0.36     59,910      21,275   0.36 
Notes:    Cell entries show the mean, standard deviation, and coefficient of variation for the housing and 
stock wealth effects across time for each state.  In general, stock wealth is more variable than 




Table 7 – Household Wealth Holdings over Time 
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2009 
Stocks  16.9 15.2 19.2 21.3 20.7 18.4 18.5 
Pooled  investment  funds 10.4 12.3 16.5 17.7 15.0 11.5 10.8 
Retirement  accounts  37.9 45.2 48.8 52.2 49.7 55.6 56.2 
Cash  value  life  insurance 34.8 32.0 29.6 28.0 24.2 23.2 24.3 
Other  managed  assets  4.0 3.9 5.9 6.6 7.3 5.6 5.7 
Primary  residence  63.9 64.7 66.2 67.7 69.1 68.9 70.3 
Other residential property  11.8 12.8 11.3 12.5 13.9 13.0 
Notes:  Cell entries show percent of households with some holdings of the specified asset in the given year.  Households are 
much more likely to own their primary residence than they are to hold stock wealth.   
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Notes:  Figure shows the percent of the adult population ages 25-34 and ages 55+ in each year for selected states and the U.S.  Observations for 1985 and 
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Massachusetts
Figure 1A: Changes in Old and Young Population Ratios in Selected States  42
 
Notes:  Figure shows the percent of the adult population ages 25-34 and ages 55+ in each year for selected states and the U.S.  Observations for 1985 and 
2009 are labeled and consecutive years are connected.   
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Figure 1B: Changes in Old and Young Population Ratios in Selected States  43
 
 
Notes:  Figure shows the poverty rate in each year of the analysis for each state.   Data are presented for the years 1985-2009; the years 1981-1984 are 


































































































Notes:  Figure shows fraction of total wealth comprised by housing wealth in each year of the analysis for each state.   Data are presented for the years 1985-







































































































Figure 3: Housing Wealth/Total Wealth across Time by State  45
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Figure 4A: Housing Wealth/Total Wealth in Selected States  46
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Figure 4B: Housing Wealth/Total Wealth in Selected States  47
 
 
Notes:  The time path of the average housing and stock wealth effects are shown for each of the five 
models presented in Table 3 (each year’s value is the average across states).  Model 1 is a traditional 
constant elasticity framework.  Model 2 allows housing and stock wealth elasticities to vary based on 
the composition of total wealth.  Model 3 includes demographic effects (age and poverty rates) but not 
wealth compositions.  Model 4 includes both age demographics and wealth compositions but not 
poverty rates.  Model 5 includes all demographic wealth composition effects; 95 percent error bands 
are calculated assuming zero cross-state correlation among wealth effects within a given year.        48
 
 
Notes:  For each state, figure shows the range of calculated housing wealth effects over the years of the analysis (1985-2009), as well as the mean, median, 
25
th percentile and 75














































































Range of Values Mean Median 25th & 75th Percentiles
Figure 6A: Range of Housing Wealth Effects over Time by State   49
 
Notes:  For each state, figure shows the range of calculated stock wealth effects over the years of the analysis (1985-2009), as well as the mean, median, 25
th 
percentile and 75
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Figure 6B: Range of Stock Wealth Effects over Time by State   50
 
 
Notes:  Figure shows the relationship between each state’s average housing and stock wealth effects 
and average total wealth within that state (averaged across over the years of the analysis, 1985-2009, 
within each state).  Panel A calculates the average housing and stock wealth effects using the 
parameter estimates from Model 4, which does not include the poverty rate.  Panel B calculates the 
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Panel B: Model 5 (full specification)
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Figure 7: Relationship between
Wealth Effects and Total Wealth  51
 
Table A1 – State Fixed Effect Coefficients for Table 3 - Model 5 
State State State 
AK  Omitted     KY  0.042 ***    NY  0.042 ***
   (0.010)    (0.009)   
AL  0.048 ***  LA  0.029 *** OH  0.054 ***
(0.010)    (0.010)    (0.008)   
AR  0.051 ***  MA  0.047 *** OK  0.044 ***
(0.012)    (0.007)    (0.009)   
AZ  0.044 ***  MD  0.034 *** OR  0.045 ***
(0.009)    (0.005)    (0.008)   
CA  0.028 ***  ME  0.061 *** PA  0.062 ***
(0.007)    (0.008)    (0.009)   
CO  0.029 ***  MI  0.047 *** RI  0.057 ***
(0.005)    (0.007)    (0.008)   
CT  0.053 ***  MN  0.051 *** SC  0.041 ***
(0.007)    (0.007)    (0.009)   
DC  0.006    MO  0.057 *** SD  0.056 ***
(0.015)    (0.008)    (0.010)   
DE  0.047 ***  MS  0.039 *** TN  0.044 ***
(0.007)    (0.011)    (0.009)   
FL  0.071 ***  MT  0.048 *** TX  0.015 **  
(0.011)    (0.010)    (0.008)   
GA  0.024 ***  NC  0.039 *** UT  0.027 ***
(0.006)    (0.008)    (0.006)   
HI  0.043 ***  ND  0.056 *** VA  0.037 ***
(0.007)    (0.009)    (0.006)   
IA  0.066 ***  NE  0.064 *** VT  0.046 ***
(0.009)    (0.008)    (0.006)   
ID  0.041 ***  NH  0.056 *** WA  0.034 ***
(0.008)    (0.005)    (0.006)   
IL  0.043 ***  NJ  0.053 *** WI  0.054 ***
(0.008)    (0.006)    (0.007)   
IN  0.048 ***  NM  0.030 *** WV  0.059 ***
(0.007)    (0.011)    (0.012)   
KS  0.051 ***  NV  0.049 *** WY  0.035 ***
(0.008)    (0.006)    (0.007)   
Notes:  Standard errors (clustered by state) are shown in parentheses below the estimates.   
*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level. 
** Coefficient significant at the 5% level. 
* Coefficient significant at the 10% level.   
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Data Appendix 
 
Consumption:  Real, per-capita retail sales 
  State-level retail sales data from 1977Q1 through 2010Q1 were provided by Moody’s 
Economy.com.  The underlying data are nominal, seasonally-adjusted annual rates at a quarterly 
frequency.  Nominal annual retail sales are the average of the quarterly figures within each year.   
Housing Wealth:  Real, per-capita value of owner-occupied housing 
  Housing wealth is measured as the average value of owner-occupied housing times the 
number of owner-occupants within each state.  The average value of owner-occupied housing 
each quarter is taken from the Land Prices by State Dataset developed by Davis and Heathcote 
(2007) and provided by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy; we use 4
th quarter figures as the 
value for the year in our annual data.
9  We use the 2011Q1 release of these data.   
  The number of owner-occupied households in each state-year is derived from the Annual 
Social and Economic (ASEC) Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS) using the 
March micro data provided by the National Bureau for Economic Research.
10  Using the 
household data in each year, the H_TENURE variable is tabulated by state using MARSUPWT 
(the March Supplement, or household sampling weight) to get an estimate of the number of 
owner-occupied, renter-occupied and total households by state.  These estimates are smoothed by 
                                                 
9 These data are updated quarterly and can be found a “Land and Property Values in the U.S.”, Lincoln Institute of 
Land Policy, http://www.lincolninst.edu/resources/.  According to the Lincoln Institute website, this figure is 
estimated in two steps.  “First, the average value for each state is estimated in 1980, 1990, and 2000 using micro 
data from the Decennial Census of Housing (DCH). Then the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) quarterly 
repeat-sales (constant quality) house price indexes for each state are used to scale the home value series by quarter 
between 1980 and 2000 and to extend the home value series back from 1980 to 1975 and forward from 2000 to the 
most recent quarter. The growth rates of the reported FHFA indexes are adjusted so that their growth between 1980-
1990 and 1990-2000 match the decennial growth of average house values from the DCH data. The 1980-1990 
growth-rate adjustments are applied to the pre-1980 FHFA data and the 1990-2000 growth-rate adjustments are 
applied to the post-2000 FHFA data.” 
10 http://www.nber.org/data/current-population-survey-data.html    53
taking the three-year (forward and lagging) moving average, in order to minimize noise induced 
by changes in the sampling weights over time.
11   
  Total nominal housing wealth for each state-year observation is simply the number of 
owner households times the average value of owner-occupied housing.   
Stock Wealth:  Real, per-capita financial assets 
  Total U.S. stock wealth is calculated as the sum of corporate equities, mutual fund shares 
and pension fund reserves for households and non-profit corporations from the Federal Reserve 
Flow of Funds (FoF) Z1 statistical release, Table L100, 2011Q1 release; annual data are year-end 
(4
th quarter) values.   
Aggregate U.S. stock wealth is allocated across states based on the distribution of mutual 
fund holdings across states.  CQS (2005) use data on mutual fund holdings by state obtained 
from the Investment Company Institute (ICI) as a proxy for the fraction of aggregate financial 
wealth held in each state in the years 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993.  Since the publicly-
available CQS (2005) data do not contain the underlying ICI mutual fund allocations, each 
state’s implied percent of aggregate U.S. financial wealth was calculated using the CQS (2005) 
Nominal Stock Market Wealth variable in each quarter.
12  The percent of financial wealth held 
by each state in 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991 and 1993 was then assumed to be the 1
st quarter values 
in these years.
13     
Additional years’ estimates of the distribution of mutual fund assets by state were 
provided directly by ICI.  For 1995, the figure is based on the same mutual fund company 
information used in CQS (2005); 2000, 2008 and 2009 figures are based on household survey 
                                                 
11 The estimated coefficients in Table 3 are qualitatively similar using the raw estimates of the number of owner-
occupied households instead of the three-year moving averages.   
12 The publicly-available data used this study can be found at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~quigley/papers.html.   
13 CQS (2005) interpolated quarterly values between these years, and analysis of the data revealed that 1
st quarter 
values were the break points in the interpolation.   54
results.  For years prior to 1986, we used the 1986 value; values for the remaining missing years 
were interpolated linearly.  
Nominal stock wealth is then aggregate U.S. financial wealth times the mutual fund 
percent for each state-year.   
Total Wealth:  Real, per-capita financial assets + real, per-capital housing wealth 
Total real, per-capita wealth is the sum of real, per-capita housing wealth and real, per-
capita stock wealth. 
Income:  Real, per-capita personal income by state 
  Annual and quarterly data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2011Q1 release).  
Population   
  Mid-year population estimates of the Census Bureau, provided in the annual personal 
income summary by state from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Intercensal population estimates 
for the 2000’s were not yet available at the time of this draft, so population estimates for 2001-
2009 are based on postcensal estimates obtained directly from the Bureau of the Census;
14 while 
the 2010 figure is from the 2010 census.   
Demographic (Age Range and Poverty) Data   
Estimated population counts by age group for 1970-2009 were obtained from the Centers 
for Disease Control CDC WONDER on-line database.
15  The Young adult population ratio is the 
                                                 
14 http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html  
15 Actual data were obtained from two different pages on the CDC WONDER website:   
Data for 1970-1989 came from: United States Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Population 
Division; Census Population 1970-2000 for Public Health Research, CDC WONDER On-line Database, March 
2003. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), Bridged-
Race Population Estimates, United States, 1990 - 2003, July 1st resident population by state, county, age, sex, race, 
and Hispanic origin, on CDC WONDER On-line Database, June 2005. Accessed at 
http://wonder.cdc.gov/census.html on Jul 11, 2011 7:47:34 PM.   
Data for 1990-2009 came from: United States Department of Health and Human Services (US DHHS), Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), Bridged-Race Population 
Estimates, United States July 1st resident population by state, county, age, sex, bridged-race, and Hispanic origin,   55
percent of the adult population ages 20-34; the Middle adult population ratio is the percent of the 
adult population ages 35-54; and the Old adult population ratio is the percent of adult population 
ages 55 and up.   
Poverty rates for each state-year were found in Historical Poverty Table 21, Number of 
Poor and Poverty Rate, by State, on the Bureau of the Census website.
16  According to notes in 
this table, the figures are estimated by the Bureau of the Census using the Annual Social and 
Economic (ASEC) Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS).   
GDP Deflator   
All real values are calculated using the Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator 
(Index 2005=100).  Data were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Federal 
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) service (Series ID: GDPDEF; 2011Q1 release).
17  Fourth 
quarter values are used as the annual figure of the index.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
compiled from 1990-1999 bridged-race intercensal population estimates and 2000-2009 (Vintage 2009) bridged-race 
postcensal population estimates, on CDC WONDER On-line Database.  Accessed at http://wonder.cdc.gov/bridged-
race-v2009.html on Jul 11, 2011 7:49:52 PM. 
16 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/people.html.   
17 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/  